The war of 1809 between France and Habsburg Austria, culminating in the titanic battle of Wagram, has been described often as Napoleon¿s last successful campaign. Napoleon said later that the manoeuvres and actions of the French army and their German allies in the opening two weeks of this conflict were among the most brilliant and skilful of his entire career. But matters might have gone very differently. A series of miscalculations, mistakes and poor communications, both prior to Austria¿s declaration of war and in the early days of hostilities, might have resulted in a major setback, if not a disaster, for the French Emperor. That they did not is due in large part to the decisions and actions of Marshal Louis Davout, the so-called ¿Iron Marshall¿This is the first English study of Marshal Davout's command and leadership in over fifty years. Little known outside of France, Louis Davout was one of the finest generals in Napoleon's army, as evidenced by his comprehensive defeat of the m
